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INTRODUCTION
It seems entirely fitting at this point in time to hold a conference to
assess the legacy of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which was
animated by an effort to extend antidiscrimination civil rights law to the
private workplace, among other settings. The initial goal was to reduce
racial discrimination-although the meaning of race discrimination was
unclear and the stipulated private, litigation-based regulatory mecha-
nisms expressed at best a modest commitment to change. The fact that
"sex" was added as a secondary cause of action, ostensibly for mixed
motives, made gender discrimination the "orphan" of civil rights law,
and discrimination against LGBT persons was not publically acknowl-
edged at all. Given all that, we might wonder why there was any legacy
t Michael McCann is the Gordon Hirabayashi Professor for the Advancement of Citizen-
ship at the University of Washington.
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of change at all. But I come here not to praise the Civil Rights Act so
much as to reflect on the reasons for its limited impact and to speculate
about the future of civil rights law, policy, and politics.
At the outset, I want to recognize the challenge for me, a straight
white guy, to talk about the legacy of legislation, litigation, and related
struggles to combat race and sex discrimination. I ask myself, "why
me?" and it's a fair question. I should also recognize at the outset that I
am not an attorney. I don't have a J.D., and that puts me in a very distinct
minority in this room. Moreover, I have the unenviable task of following
all of the great speakers who have preceded me today and yesterday.
This has left me with a strong sense that everything has been said, and I
already mentioned in one of my questions to a previous panelist that I
need to change the name of my talk to "Summing Up," because I'm not
sure I have a whole lot that's new to say, although I think there will be a
little bit of a change in focus. And, finally, I have to recognize that I ap-
pear as someone who hails from Seattle, the land of the Seahawk, and I
find myself in a world of the Bronco ....
So let me state at the outset the standpoint from where I do speak
and what I'm going to try to bring to this talk. I grew up in the American
South during the 1960s. I went to schools that did not begin to desegre-
gate until over a decade after Brown v. Board of Education.' I worked in
the construction industry, while a teen, which lead me to involvement in
labor activism in the building trades and later among farm workers in
northern Florida, during the same years that the EEOC was aggressively
working with citizen groups to file lawsuits under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. People yesterday talked about being nearly as old as the
Civil Rights Act; well, I'm a lot older than the statute. I eventually
moved to California, partly to get out of the South, but mostly to study
political science at UC Berkley, where I became a sociolegal scholar
interested in issues of class, gender, and race, with a focus in particular
on the history of labor in American society and the contrast between the
different trajectories of nation states in the U.S. and Europe. My primary
interest since then has been to understand how law shapes relationships
of hierarchical power, contests over asymmetric power, and the possibili-
ties for change in power relations affecting ordinary working people. I
have tried to balance my interest in class, gender, and race as a legal
scholar, as a political analyst, and as a labor activist, much of it from
various groups I've been associated with, but since 1991 as an affiliate of
the Harry Bridges Labor Center, at the University of Washington, which
in many ways is my proudest professional affiliation. Those commit-
ments were evident in the book that I wrote about gender-based pay equi-
I. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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ty, entitled Rights at Work.2 It has been a great opportunity preparing for
this talk because I have not worked directly on gender-based pay equity
for a long time, although my scholarship has continued to address dis-
crimination, civil rights, and the various ways in which law provides
opportunities and constraints for struggles over social equality.
I have chosen as the title of my talk: Money, Sex, and Power. I real-
ly like that title, but it is not original. It owes to a good friend of mine,
Professor Emeritus Nancy Hartsock at the University of Washington.
3
She wrote a classic book on feminist theory in the 1980s, and I thought it
fit what I wanted to talk about. My focus will emphasize the lost poten-
tial of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for improving the capacities of women
and people of color to earn good incomes, find good jobs, exercise a
voice in the workplace, enhance their roles as providers for themselves
and their families, and take on roles as active citizens. My address will
focus to some degree on wage equity, but it will transcend that to talk
about other related issues as well.
I. SOME FRUSTRATING FACTS ABOUT CONTINUING GENDER
INEQUALITY
I begin by recognizing some important facts. I start with a graph
that I take from a study by Laura Beth Nielsen and Bob Nelson that has
been mentioned before by other speakers.4 What this shows is the
amount of employment-based civil rights litigation over the last forty
years. Whatever we might say about the legacy of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, there has not been a shortage of litigation. There were tens of thou-
sands of cases that have been pursued each year, especially with a big
spike in the 1980s. And I will come back to that in just a moment.
With this legacy of litigation in mind, I turn to some frustrating
facts about the status of women's income and earnings.5 We all know
that the earnings of women in 2012 working full-time, year-round were
about 76.5 cents to every dollar paid to male counterparts. The wage gap
was even larger for women of color. Black women who were working
full-time, year-round made only sixty-four cents to the white male stand-
2. MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
3. See NANCY C.M. HARTSOCK, MONEY, SEX, AND POWER: TOWARD A FEMINIST
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (1983).
4. A longitudinal bar graph was displayed in the talk, derived from a study by Laura Beth
Nielsen and Robert Nelson. See generally LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., CONTESTING WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION IN COURT: CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 1987-2003, at 3 (2008), available at
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/nielsen abf edlreport 08 final.pdf
5. The data referred to in the section on "frustrating facts" is primarily derived from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and is widely available. I relied on several web-based sources to obtain
these findings. See, e.g., Women's Earnings and Income, CATALYST (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/womens-eamings-and-income.
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point. Hispanic women made only fifty-four cents for every dollar paid
to their white, non-Hispanic male counterparts. Median annual earnings
for full-time, year-round women workers in 2012 were $37,791 com-
pared to men's $49,398.
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Now in some ways we can see this as a glass half full. When one
compares these earnings ratios to the 1960s, when women made fifty-
nine cents to every dollar that men made, the increase to nearly 77% is
significant. But I want to suggest that the apparent gains in equity not
only still fall far short, but they are less than simple aggregate ratios sug-
gest. For one thing, the reasons for that decrease in the wage gap be-
tween men and women resulted partly from the advances of the roughly
15% of women who made it into the upper management positions where
the pay is very good. If you take those increases out of the overall picture
and look at the bottom two-thirds of women, then the data look a lot
more discouraging and depressing. I think it is important to see that if we
take out that upper crust, we see that women represent nearly two-thirds
(61%) of minimum-wage workers. Nearly four in ten of these female
minimum-wage workers are women of color. Women are, moreover,
nearly two-thirds of workers in occupations that depend largely on tips; it
is worth mentioning that the federal minimum cash-wage for tipped
workers is $2.31 an hour. Moreover, data on full-time earners, as Nancy
Reichman pointed out very appropriately, obscures the fact that a large
percentage of women do not work full-time, but rather are relegated to
part-time, temporary, contingent work, so that the earnings gap reflects
6. NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., FACT SHEET: THE WAGE GAP IS STAGNANT IN LAST
DECADE tbl.2 (2012), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/poverty daywagegapsheet.pdf.
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not just unequal wages but the different number of hours that women
tend to work.
Now there are many reasons that can be provided for why there is
this gender-based wage gap, but labor economists tell us that certainly
one of the primary reasons has to do with occupational segregation. Now
that actually has not been talked about that much in this conference, so
maybe everyone just took it for granted. The key point is that women
historically have tended to be channeled into certain kinds of occupa-
tions. Those occupations tend to be paid less, even when the value of the
work and the criteria for entering those jobs are comparable to men who
are paid at much higher rates. The graph displayed (Figure B) is a little
bit complicated, but on the left side you see different kinds of occupa-
tions; the red bars reflect level of female participation in those occupa-
tions, while the blue bars capture the levels of male participation in dif-
ferent jobs. This clearly captures the gender-intensive character of many
occupations. On the right side you can see the earnings for the different
occupations. You can see a direct correlation: the more red they are, the
lower paid they are, the more blue they are, the higher paid they are. This
is a classic comparison of occupational segregation and the ways in
which wages tend to follow that split.
Figure B: Occupational Sex Segregation
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7 One of Twenty Facts About U.S. Inequality that Everyone Should Know: Occupational Sex Segre-
gation, STANFORD UNIV., http://www.stanford.edu/group/scspi/cgi-bin/fact6.php (last visited Aug. 1,
2014) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HIGHLIGHTS OF
WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN 2008: REPORT 1017 (2009), available at
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2008.pdo.
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Job segregation has surprisingly not changed that much since the
1960s. A recent study by labor economist Francine Blau, at Cornell, and
her colleagues found that there was a significant change in the occupa-
tional segregation in the 1970s.8 They found about a 6.1% decline in
occupational segregation, and with that, women moving into higher pay-
ing jobs. But that rate of decline fell in the 1980s to 4.3%, and since then
it's been nearly flat, with only 2% decline in occupational segregation i
the 1990s; there has been virtually no change in occupational segregation
in the 2000s. So that, in part, gives us a handle on the problem, as we can
also see that moments of declining occupational segregation correlated
directly with the declining wage gap. As the declining occupational seg-
regation has slowed, so too has the decrease in the wage gap.
The larger picture is also complicated by the fact that the increase in
wage equity has reflected in part the overall stagnation of wages since
the 1970s. In particular, while women's wages went up some, part of the
reason for the declining gap was that men's wages have been declining
since the 1970s. So one of the problems with just focusing on wage equi-
ty is that equity is just about the comparison, either racial comparison or
gender comparison. But if everyone in the bottom half or even two-thirds
of wage earners is doing worse, then equity is actually a mixed cause for
celebration at best. This has led to some interesting dynamics among
married couples. The Pew Research Center looked at earnings data for
married women and men in the United States aged thirty to forty-four in
2007. The study found that recent economic gains usually associated
with marriage "have been greater for men than for women," and that is
because women are making more money, and men are making less mon-
ey.9 So what used to be the benefit for women of marrying a man with a
lot of money has actually been reversed, at least in a small kind of way.
Finally, the future does not look very encouraging. The projected
job growth in the next decade is disproportionately in low-wage, female-
dominated occupations. Of the thirty predicted high growth occupations
in Bureau of Labor statistics, those occupations that are projected to
grow the most tend to be female-intensive and low-paid. Disproportion-
ately, 60% of the workers in the thirty jobs that are expected to grow
most are female, and they are concentrated in low-wage occupations.
Nearly two-thirds of the thirty high-growth jobs are female-dominated,
within workforces that are 60% or more male. Almost half of those jobs
that are projected for growth typically pay less than $13.50 an hour. Five
of those job classes are very low-wage, typically paying less than $10 an
8. Francine D. Blau et al., Trends in Occupational Segregation by Gender 1970-2009:
Adjusting for the Impact of Changes in the Occupational Coding System 4, 26-27 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17993, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17993.
9. RICHARD FRY & D'VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WOMEN, MEN AND THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE 1 (2010), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/1I/new-economics-of-marriage.pdf.
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hour. Among the thirteen lowest wage high-growth jobs, twice as many
are female-dominated compared to male-dominated jobs. So not only do
things look grim now, but they are not going in the direction we would
like for the great majority of working women. Twenty-five years ago we
might have thought things were getting better.
With low wages, also, it is important to realize there are fewer op-
portunities for upward mobility, for higher education skill development,
and especially for voice and choice over the terms of work at the work-
place. These are the jobs, low-paying jobs, that are often the most diffi-
cult to organize and to unionize, and they are the jobs that afford workers
the least control over the terms of the work they perform. They are the
most vulnerable jobs, not only in terms of income, but in almost all the
ways we think about work as an important part of life. Add all that-low
wages, low return, low opportunities-to the fact that female workers
have to contend with costs in the U.S. that are greater than in many parts
of the world, especially in the global north. The U.S. is far behind the
world in paid family leave, guaranteed healthcare, daycare for children,
and after-school programs. Single mothers are the most disadvantaged,
but a great majority of women are still the primary caregivers in society
and thus are negatively affected.
So that is just a quick trot through data suggesting the degree of
continued injustice. And this prompts the question: Why, fifty years after
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and after the Equal Pay Act, has there not been
more change in the wages of women and decreases in occupational seg-
regation and the other manifestations of gender and race-based discrimi-
nation in the workplace? As I mentioned, it's not for the lack of lawsuits.
There have been tens of thousands of lawsuits filed alleging gender and
racial-based discrimination in the workplace. So why has civil rights
litigation made so little difference, and what can we expect in the future?
II. CRITICAL FEMINIST THEORY ON THE LIMITS OF RIGHTS-BASED
STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE
One place to look for an answer is the abundant amount of scholar-
ship on rights and rights-based litigation. Feminist theorists in particular
offer many reasons why perhaps this rights-based, litigation-oriented
strategy of challenging discrimination and producing social justice was
very limited. I will just run through a couple of those arguments, alt-
hough I am sure you are already familiar with many of the points.
One very basic argument, going back to Marx, is that rights at best
are a "political lion's skin."'0 Rights tend to be useful for limiting arbi-
trary forms of harm, but are not very useful for challenging and trans-
forming the structural hierarchies created by capitalist societies. Much of
10. KARL MARX, ON THE JEWISH QUESTION 13 (Helen Lederer trans., 1958) (1844).
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feminist theory builds on that basic argument. Moreover, rights like those
guaranteed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act enable victims of invidious
wrongs to challenge injuries of discrimination, harmful exclusion, or
marginalization, but such rights claiming arguably only compounds the
problems. Scholars like Wendy Brown have argued that rights claiming
ends up reinforcing and reifying the subordinate identity of the injured
victim who needs the state's support and thus lacks the independence and
social power of the fully entitled, rights-bearing individual. 1 Rights
don't make people whole but rather institutionalize the stigmatized status
of the claimant. This dynamic is supported by some empirical sociolegal
studies of ordinary people in workplaces who have experienced discrim-
ination. These studies show that women and people of color are very
reluctant to even name the fact of discrimination or to claim rights, much
less to call a lawyer and initiate a formal action.12 This is very important.
I have heard a couple times over the last day that existing law is pretty
good at dealing with routine forms of overt, explicit discrimination. Well
that may be true when cases get into the courtroom; the problem is that
very little of the discrimination that actually occurs is ever challenged in
the courtroom because people are very reluctant to demand their rights.
Part of the reason is the stigma for rights-bearing individuals. Claiming
rights is a way to mark oneself as less than fully independent and less
than fully deserving of the rights that one claims: this is one of the great
paradoxes of rights.
Moreover, as Wendy Brown further argues, even when rights grant
momentary redress, inclusion, or even empowerment, they may "become
at another time a regulatory discourse-a means of obstructing or co-
opting more radical political demands or simply the most hollow of emp-
ty promises.' 3 It is not surprising that, historically, the conception of the
rights-bearing subject has been based on demonstrating discipline and
orderly conformity, and we have heard a lot at this conference about all
the pressures that are increasing on people to go along with whatever
their employers want in the workplace. That is going to be a theme that I
come back to in a moment.
Other feminist theorists like Nancy Fraser offer a slightly different
but related critique.14 Her work has very clearly shown that struggles for
equal rights often pursue along two different kinds of lines. One is a de-
mand for respect, for recognition, to be recognized for one's difference
in a way that is nonstigmatizing. This is what she calls "the politics of
recognition." But another demand often goes along with claims of rights,
11. Wendy Brown, Rights and Identity in Late Modernity: Revisiting the "Jewish Question,"
in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 85, 87-89 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
12. KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
VICTIMS 1-4 (1988).
13. Brown, supra note 11, at 87.
14. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, 3 NEW LEFT REV. 107, 107-09 (2000).
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which is demand for redistribution, in order to repair the injuries that are
longstanding in society and which provide remedy for those harms; it is a
demand for substantive material justice. But what Fraser argues is what
often happens, and did happen in second-wave feminist politics in par-
ticular, is that the focus on recognition, on winning respect as a rights-
bearing citizen, and not being treated in a differential way that stigmatiz-
es, often trumps the focus on redistribution. The material claims for
money or for a transfornation in material relations often get lost in a
claim of identity politics. It is easy to see that as a partial explanation for
the lack of focus on economic justice for women. Lots of other critical
arguments have been advanced about the limits and problems of rights.
One is that rights inherently individualize claims in the workplace, so
they divide workers in the workplace against each other. Workers have
little in common, and rights encourage them to pursue their own claims
for themselves in a way that diminishes the potential for solidarity and
collective action. Fraser specifically links this dynamic to the splintering
of the women's movement. The individualizing rights claiming impact
has something to do with the loss of solidarity over time.
One of the interesting points Nancy Fraser made in one of her more
recent books is a way in which feminism has become co-opted by, or
merged comfortably with, neoliberalism. The propensity for claiming
rights fits right in with the individualizing tendencies and even entrepre-
neurial ethic of neoliberalism. Moreover, the feminist attack on the old
family-wage idea was not really matched with an alternative conception
of living wages or minimum wages or minimum income to which people
should be entitled. The state and state policies were attacked as being
paternalistic, but with that went reliance on voluntarism and individual-
ism again which prevented the kind of collective action that was neces-
sary to challenge hierarchical organized power. Whereas in Europe and
Canada women often aimed to infiltrate the state to influence state policy
and state regulatory enforcement mechanisms dealing with questions of
inequality at work, women in the United States and feminists in particu-
lar pursued rights-based strategies that were more individualistic and less
transformative in the aggregate.
Partly for these reasons, I think there is some reason to believe that
we are witnessing a cultural exhaustion with civil rights in America. We
often think that the United States is a land where rights trump other kinds
of claims,15 but rights claims do not seem to carry the same kind of nor-
15. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 131 (1974).
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mative authority or faith that they once did. In fact, there is a palpable
frustration with invoking civil rights types of claims.'
I offer one recent example supporting this claim. I am sure that
many of you have read the recent Shriver Report, A Women's Nation
Pushes Back from the Brink, sponsored by the Center for American Pro-
gress.17 A lot of the economic data presented in that report matches the
kind of frustrating facts that I just cited here and that has been talked
about at this conference, and a lot of the report's policy prescriptions
track those that have been talked about here as well. What I found really
interesting about that pamphlet, though, is that there is virtually nothing
about the Civil Rights Act, nothing about rights, nothing about law, and
no lawyers anywhere in the text. You see a bunch of celebrities: Be-
yonc6, Eva Longoria, and even LeBron James! But there's nothing about
the legacy of the Equal Pay Act, Civil Rights Act, litigation, lawyers, or
framing these issues in terms of basic rights to deal with the problems of
discrimination. I found that interesting and, perhaps, revealing about
where we are politically.
Now I think there is much truth in all of kinds of claims about the
limits of rights talk that I just listed briefly. But I want to suggest that this
frustration and disenchantment with rights, and even with litigation, is a
bit overblown. There should be no doubt that rights are a limited dis-
course, and they are linked to a history of constructing subjects in ways
that individualize aspirations and actions. But that is not the only way to
think about rights and how they work in social practice. Likewise, litiga-
tion by itself is a very limited kind of reform strategy, but litigation can
also often be a part of broader-based movements and, when joined to
other tactics, can be a very effective tactic. I understand critiques of
rights-I gave a presidential talk for the Law and Society Association,
where I made the case for the limitations and problems of rights as a re-
source for social change. I also used to be a part of a group of theoretical-
ly inclined empirical sociolegal scholars with the informal name the
"Rights Suck" group. All that said, my primary point here is we
shouldn't give up on rights, and we shouldn't give up on litigation, but
we need to rethink why civil rights law has not been more consequential.
III. A DIFFERENT EXPLANATION: POWER AND POLITICS OF LAW
I want to offer a simpler explanation for what I think happened, for
why I think the civil rights legacy was not more transformative than it
was. My account is going to be a much more political story. It is a story
16. See George 1. Lovell, The Myth ofthe Myth of Rights, in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND
SOCIETY VOLUME 59, SPECIAL ISSUE: THE LEGACY OF STUART SCHEINGOLD I, 8 (Austin Sarat ed.,
2012).
17. MARIA SHRIVER, A WOMAN'S NATION PUSHES BACK FROM THE BRINK, SHRIVER REP.
(Jan. 12, 2014), http://shriverreport.org/special-report/a-womans-nation-pushes-back-from-the-
brink/.
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about the politics that Title VII facilitated and which flourished for a
particular moment, but then which was killed off by powerful opponents
and forces. In some ways what I want to do is try and present a short
story recovering the memory of what was killed off, not to urge repeating
that history, but to learn from it and think about how we can reproduce it
in new forms today.
First of all, we must recognize that it is arguably not rights or litiga-
tion per se, but the limitations of the Civil Rights Act in particular, that
have been part of the problem. The Civil Rights Act was built to achieve
at best modest change; it was designed to be a very limited resource for
social transformation. The Act was vague about the terms of what counts
as discrimination, as I mentioned at the outset. If we go back to the rec-
ord of debates, we see that discourses about discrimination are all over
the place and often no place at the same time. Moreover, the Act relied
on private litigation as a mechanism of enforcement and deterrence,
which puts the burden on victims to become plaintiffs and develop a le-
gal claim.'8 The EEOC, the regulatory body authorized to enforce the
Act, was given few resources, very little state capacity; it originally
could not sue, it had a very small staff, and so forth. This was a new kind
of social regulatory experiment and one that we know was designed not
to disrupt the status quo a great deal. It also became. a model for later
forms of social regulation like the Environmental Policy Act. Finally, the
inclusion of sex discrimination was an afterthought. There are many sto-
ries of how that happened. But by all accounts, in the early years, both in
terms of the Act itself and the EEOC, the issue of sex discrimination was
taken at best to be a marginal concern. The Act was primarily focused on
racial discrimination. So it is not surprising that an Act that was designed
not to have much impact did not lead to radical change. Again-to come
back to my opening words-it is surprising that it's much of a legacy to
talk about at all.
The second thing that I want to say is that a lot of critiques of rights
only focus on the most limited, narrow, negative versions of rights
grounded in the proprietarian, contract-based tradition of liberalism. But
other conceptions of rights have more positive, transformative possibili-
ties, and those rights have actually been recognized in our liberal tradi-
tion, and in fact were connected to some of the activism after the Act was
passed. Everyone knows-it has been talked about at this conference-
about the two basic standards for demonstrating discrimination in the
1964 Civil Rights Act. One is the disparate treatment standard; the other
is disparate impact. Several people said that I would be talking about
impact theory, and that is what I'm going to do now.
18. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 85,94-95 (2010).
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Disparate treatment depends on, for the most part, a showing of
willful, intentional, or at least foreseeable indifference to harm against
victims. It can be shown by "pattern or practice," but it generally goes to
the logic of causation and demonstrated intent. Intentional discrimination
is at the core of the disparate treatment test. It best fits cases where em-
ployers, or those working under employers, engage in a certain kind of
hostile action that causes harm, usually to discrete, targeted individuals.
So it is grounded in a very individualized model of harm and of redress.
It tends to be very personalized and expressive of individual animus. The
important implication of that model is that it presumes that discrimina-
tion-whether it's sexual discrimination, gender discrimination, or race
discrimination-is anomalous in an otherwise just, market-based society.
It at least implicitly enforces the view that markets for the most part
work to ensure fairness, and we need a mechanism to deal with those
anomalous moments when some sort of racial or gender animus is dis-
played. There's an overall kind of ideological trap that I want to suggest
that goes hand-in-hand with that logic of discrimination. Again, I want to
emphasize that such logic of individualized action, of individualized
modes of discrimination and redress, are ones that are available still, and
courts are often pretty good on those types of simpler issues we might
say. However, again, we know from studies of individuals that women
and people of color are very reluctant to make claims in the workplace
out of fear of retaliation; even if you win a claim and get momentary
change, it's going to cost you in the long run. Especially in increasingly
difficult work conditions, where jobs are scarce and wages are low, the
assumption of risk that claiming and naming rights against intentional
discrimination in the workplace imposes is not something that many
people seize upon very quickly.
But I want to talk mostly about the other logic under the Civil
Rights Act, that of disparate impact, and to some degree the logic of
"pattern or practice," which I've always thought bridges the disparate
treatment and disparate impact, so I will include that under the broader
logic of impact here. I want to suggest that disparate impact is not just a
different standard of demonstrating discrimination; it's a whole different
theory of discrimination. It is, moreover, linked at least potentially to
wholly different repertoires of action demanding change. This concep-
tion of discrimination and response to discrimination was grounded in a
legacy of going back to early in the century, well before the Civil Rights
Act. It was embraced by many of the initial activists in the EEOC during
the late 1960s and was embraced by many groups that seized upon the
1964 Civil Rights Act and tried to make it work. Many people identify
disparate impact with the Griggs9 decision, and I think that is right, but I
want to move beyond the narrow legalist understanding of this precedent
19. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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to talk about what activists did in expanding the logic of harm and reme-
dy much further than what courts actually fully recognize. Creative pro-
gressive activists could always point to court decisions to justify this way
of thinking about action, but, nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that
this expansive vision was settled law at any particular moment. We
might say that the EEOC and Griggs opened a door, but the room of pos-
sible workplace political actions beyond the door was very large.
I want to suggest that there are seven features that distinguish dis-
parate impact, as imagined by worker activists in and beyond the pay
equity movement, which is where I engaged in a lot of scholarly and
activist work in the 1980s.20 These key features were common in both
gender- and race-based disparate impact claims from the late 1960s until
the late 1980s.
21
A. Discrimination Is Structural
The first and most important feature that distinguishes disparate im-
pact from disparate treatment theory is in understanding discrimination
not as anomalous and unusual in a market society, but rather that dis-
crimination-race-based, gender-based, and sexuality-based discrimina-
tion-permeates institutionalized processes and practices. Race and sex
and sexuality discrimination is structurally embedded; it is all over the
place. That is the norm. The norm is not fairness and equal treatment;
racial, gender, and sexual hierarchy is the norm. Discrimination is not a
matter of individual, personal animus necessarily, but it permeates a host
of norms, practices, and relationships, both within the employment
sphere and beyond in broader social relations that channel women and
people of color into some jobs rather than others. Those structural forces
impede mobility up ladders and across to other job ladders, to occupa-
tions that are grounded in assessments that undervalue female and racial
minority workers' worth in those jobs and what women and people of
color want and deserve from work. These discriminatory norms are re-
produced often unconsciously by practices, expectations, and assump-
tions that are reproduced over time. And they are rationalized by a host
of ideological constructs that are largely on their face blind to gender and
to race-ideological rationales about markets, merit, supply-and-
demand, and efficiency. So that is the basic premise of disparate impact
claims.
20. See generally MCCANN, supra note 2.
21. This discussion of disparate impact doctrine, its key features, and its demise is outlined in
greater detail in an unpublished paper on file with the author. Michael McCann et al., Executing
"Good" Civil Rights Law: A Political History of Wards Cove v. Atonio 1-2 (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
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B. Dispensing with Demonstrations of Intent
The structural impact is important because in many ways it dis-
penses with the formality of having to prove intentional discrimination.
First of all, intent is not the basis of disparate impact claims. The chal-
lenge is not trying to prove that there are some bad people who mean to
harm other people. The focus instead is on institutionalized practices and
protocols that reproduce hierarchy. Good people often reproduce gender
and race discrimination. The focus is on identifying oppression, not op-
pressors.
C. Enhanced Empirical Evidence
Moreover, proving intent is very difficult. That is the other really
important point here. The case for disparate impact is often empirically
much stronger than that for disparate treatment. It is often harder to
prove intentional discrimination, which focuses on a person's cognitive
processes. But it is often somewhat easier to prove disparate impact,
largely because lots of large organizations have elaborate job charts that
enable comparing wages to what people in different occupations make
and show that ladders from one job to another job do not connect to other
jobs. There are many types of institutional data that show the ways in
which work organization is unequally structured and the ways in which
wages of women in particular and people of color are systematically pro-
duced by that job segregation. Plaintiffs can put those data together with
testimony of workers in depositions and on the stand at trial, thus provid-
ing quite a compelling account about the reasons why there are dispari-
ties in wages and limited opportunities for mobility within and among
organizations.
D. Loosening Standards of Direct Causality
To empirically demonstrate patterns of discrimination is not only
easier, but it is often grounded in a logic that loosens the positivist causal
connection that is often demanded in law. If discrimination is a product
of a whole variety of interrelated practices and norms and relationships,
trying to find a single specific practice that accounts for the unequal out-
come is rather futile. The disparate impact logic invites a much more
holistic, complex, institutional way of understanding things. And in one
of the cases in which I was a part of in the 1980s, that was exactly the
way in which the cases were presented-days and days of testimony of
women's experience, along with charts of all the ladders among jobs that
can be put that next to the wages, enabling plaintiffs to paint a much
more complicated but compelling, convincing story. And it is very im-
portant that it was empirically easier to demonstrate, but it does not re-
quire that causal connection to a specific business practice. Some federal
court decisions in the 1970s supported this inclination to loosen that
causal link between specific practices and discriminatory impact.
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E. Structural Solutions for Structural Problems
If the problem is defined in structural terms, then, the solution has
to be structural. If the problem is comprehensive and built into all of the-
se interrelated practices, norms, and relationships, the solution has to be
multidimensional and comprehensive, and it probably will take a long
time to implement. In discussions about pay equity and comparable
worth, those terms are often used together, but I think it's very important
to distinguish them. Comparable worth is a technocratic fix. Most of the
campaigns for pay equity that I learned about did not seek a technocratic
fix, which the experts and consultants often wanted. As advocates used
to say, it will take at least fifty years to undo what took hundreds of years
to happen. And the solution is going to require lots of different reforms
proceeding concurrently. Activists in most cases did not look for or ex-
pect or even want a one-time fix.
F. Facilitating Collective Worker Action
Meaningful structural reform not only adopts the victim's perspec-
tive,22 as we often say, but the victims themselves have to be part of
naming the problem and shaping the reforms themselves. One of the
things that's distinctive about the pay-equity movement, and a lot of oth-
er race-based movements about which I am researching now, is that it
was critical not only to organize workers at the level of filing claims and
then at the discovery process and then at building the case in court, but it
was especially important in building worker participation into the im-
plementation of negotiated remedies. Remedies meant that workers had
to have more of a role in forming committees that would engage in long-
term monitoring processes and deal with all the connected issues of wage
equity, hiring, job promotion, building new ladders among jobs, and so
forth.
G. Expanding the Rights Agenda
And then, finally, once women and workers generally organize to
deal with those issues, they often begin to recognize other rights-based
issues that they share in common: the need for family leave, the lack of
health benefits, the lack of good retirement benefits, the lack of daycare.
A key part of the story I tried to tell about pay equity in Rights at Work is
that, once women organize, they not only become less reluctant to begin
to claim rights, but they began to think about a lot of other issues in
terms of rights that badly needed to be addressed. That was a central
point I was trying to make in the book-I interviewed hundreds of wom-
en around the country who were involved in these campaigns, and I doc-
22. The "victim's perspective" is a concept developed in Alan Freeman's classic essay. Alan
Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainty, Contradiction, Rationalization,
Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 285, 287-88 (David Kairys ed., 1998).
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umented what often is called a developing "rights consciousness." A lot
of women said: "I never really thought about rights, I never took them
that seriously. I never considered myself a feminist; that is what white,
college-educated women do. I never considered myself a union activist.
But now I do, I consider myself a feminist union activist demanding
rights, after going through the struggle for fair pay." The political pro-
cess of claiming rights and shaping remedies changed the way they
looked at their work lives, and how they viewed themselves; it recon-
structed their subjectivities.
IV. THE EXECUTION OF GOOD CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
So we saw this explosion of workplace activity around institutional
racism and sexism around the country, starting in the late 1960s with
black construction workers and taking off more broadly in the 1970s.
When I was researching about pay-equity politics, I documented at least
100 campaigns at workplaces at local and/or state levels around the
country. Now much of this was below the radar of social scientists and of
law professors, because in most of these cases, lawsuits were filed and
they often settled. And that was the point-not to have to go to trial, or at
least to a judgment, but to get the trial, leverage for settlement or collec-
tive bargaining success, and then let the organized women workers take
over. And then continue to say we will go back and refile the lawsuit or
pursue a new lawsuit if necessary. So all this politics did not make a big
impact on case law, but it did depend on a perception that the courts were
open to these types of claims. So now we must ask: what happened?
The story I will relate now is fairly simple and tragic: if the advances that
were made during this time were due to a politics of rights at the local
level, it was also politics that undid all of this. It was macro-politics at
the national level.
The key case that I would pinpoint as a turning point in ending the
collectivist politics challenging institutional sexism and racism was
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio23 in 1989.24 I ended my 1994 book,
Rights at Work, long ago by recognizing the impact of that case, and I am
writing a book about the actual Wards Cove case now, twenty-five years
later after I did that original work. Our25 focus is on the social history of
Wards Cove. Wards Cove developed from a lawsuit that was filed by
Filipino activists who worked in the Alaskan salmon canneries, where
work conditions were structured on a modified race-based plantation
model that had been around for hundreds of years. This plantation model
was adapted from southern slavery and reproduced around the Pacific
Rim canneries in Hawaii and Alaska, as well as in the agricultural sectors
23. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
24. See McCann et al., supra note 2 1, at I.
25. The developing book and related articles are co-authored with my colleague, George
Lovell, also at the University of Washington. The book will be titled A Union by Law.
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of seasonal work in California, Oregon, and Washington. The Filipino
American plaintiffs challenged the fact that the entire workforce was
segregated-that Filipino workers and Native Americans were the only
ones who worked in the factory line doing all the cleaning and cutting up
of the fish in very dangerous and unhealthy conditions. Whereas all of
the lower level jobs were held by Asian American and Native American
workers, jobs in the middle to higher levels were all held almost exclu-
sively by white workers. Workers lived in different quarters, ate different
food, assumed very different risks, lived in different worlds. This was a
quasi-slave-based kind of system. And the plaintiffs challenged that sys-
tem as invidiously discriminatory.
The Wards Cove case was one of three cases that the Filipino can-
nery workers filed. The first two won at the trial level and then settled.
These cases advanced very important efforts by the plaintiffs to not only
change workplace conditions, but also to take over a union from corrupt,
unresponsive leaders who slipped into control during the McCarthy Era,
and who had brought in gambling rings and prostitution rings that were
basically exploiting the workers when they would go up to Alaska. The
strategy of organizing rank-and-file workers around the lawsuits worked.
As a result of filing these lawsuits, the dissident workers formed the
Alaska Cannery Workers Association, kicked out the old leaders, and
enabled a group of young, radical Filipinos and a multiracial group of
allies to take over the union.
A third prong of what the strategy, believe it or not, was to bring
down Ferdinand Marcos, the autocratic Philippine leader. The plaintiffs
were young democratic socialists and part of a broad alliance in the Pu-
get Sound area fighting against American imperial activities around the
world, including the support for Marcos. Their ambitious venture in-
curred great risks for the activists. Two of the leaders who planned the
three cases, Gene Viernes and Silme Domingo, were murdered in 1981
by Filipino gang thugs in Seattle. A later civil trial for wrongful death
showed that the thugs worked for the corrupt union boss-his gun was
the murder weapon-and that the money came from Ferdinand Marcos,
most likely with some CIA knowledge. That is a very interesting side
story-please read the book when it comes out.
Nevertheless, the minority plaintiffs of color, which included some
females, challenged the conditions at work in ways similar to legions of
black construction workers before them and women demanding pay eq-
uity after them. But what happened was that the Wards Cove claim, the
third lawsuit, unexpectedly ended up before the U.S. Supreme Court and
marked a turning point in the history of disparate impact doctrine and the
26collectivist workplace politics that it facilitated. It was a turning point
26. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-60.
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for a lot of things we've talked about today. Case law was all over the
place in the 1970s and '80s in interpreting disparate impact. Neverthe-
less, demonstrations of statistical disparities and remedies that were pro-
portional to the violation were upheld in some cases.
What the majority said in Wards Cove was stunning. The first thing
they did was erase basic precedents. It was mentioned the other day that
some of the precedents from the 1970s still exist. What was interesting
about the majority decision is that it did not recognize that they were
ignoring or overturning any precedents. The majority just disregarded
them in defining new standards. In fact, that is what the dissenting mi-
nority Justices, Stevens and Blackmun, said: Justice Stevens, writing for
four justices, referred to the "majority's facile treatment of settled law,
27
and stated that their "casual-almost summary-rejection of the statuto-
ry construction that developed in the wake of Griggs is most disturb-
ing. '28 Stevens added that the majority was "[t]urning a blind eye to the
meaning and purpose of Title VII" and lamented the conservative majori-
,,29
ty's "latest sojourn into judicial activism.
Specifically, one thing that the majority did was to change the bur-
den of proof. The majority ruling put the burden of persuasion on the
plaintiffs from start to end, which was a change in law. Moreover, the
majority demanded a clear showing of a direct causal link between spe-
cific business practices and the alleged discriminatory impact. As such,
they required a disaggregation of interrelated, historically developed
institutional relations into discrete elements of the labor supply line in
ways that implicitly gutted the structural logic of disparate impact
claims. The majority also expanded the "business necessity" defense to
the point where, as Justice White implies at one point, the prerogatives of
employers almost always will and should prevail. And the majority ex-
panded the market defense in the process, so that, as one female pay eq-
uity activist whom I interviewed long ago put it, "discrimination is all
right if everyone else does it."
Another key point was the allegation that the workers did not show
sufficient interest in the better jobs because they could not demonstrate
that any one worker engaged in protracted efforts to move out of the line
jobs into the management jobs. This is in an industry where for eighty
years, only Asian-Americans and Native Americans worked on the floor
processing fish, and only whites were hired in the other jobs! The plain-
tiffs were blamed because they did not try hard enough to break that his-
torically rigid barrier. The Court held that each aggrieved worker would
have to bring an individual lawsuit, and each lawsuit would have to show
that the plaintiff made a strong effort to break into those jobs. The prob-
27. Id. at 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 671 72.
29. Id. at 663.
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lem is that the workers needed to be more entrepreneurial, as neoliberals
put it. We've heard this about workers, right? This is the new model that
Nancy Reichman was talking about. That is what the majority of Justices
reasoned in Wards Cove. It is an interesting claim for lots of reasons, not
least that one of the "unskilled" plaintiffs went on to become an architect
and another a graduate student in public administration. In dismissing the
plaintiffs' claims, Justice White made clear whose interests should be the
base line: "Courts are generally less competent than employers to re-
structure business practices; consequently, the judiciary should proceed
with care before mandating that an employer must adopt a[n] alterna-
tive ... hiring practice in response to a Title VII suit."' 30 The dissenters
again questioned these claims by the majority about legal justification for
judicial deference to employer prerogatives.
In short, this case erased both precedents and critical social facts.
31
And in the pay-equity movement in 1989, everybody saw this ruling as
the death of pay-equity claims. If these were the new standards articulat-
ed by the highest court in the land, then the possibilities for those ele-
ments of disparate impact that were critical to the structural challenge to
discrimination in the workplace were now erased history. Many of the
activists in the pay-equity movement joined the Wards Cove plaintiffs
and other activists to push for the 1991 Civil Rights Act. As many of you
know, that Act did make some changes that were favorable to certain
elements of disparate treatment cases, but the Act did little to restore
those elements that were favorable to disparate impact. We know the
outcome of this. If you look historically at legal activity after 1991-here
I'm using the Nielsen and Nelson data-there was a dramatic increase
from 1987 to 2003 in the amount of employment litigation under the
Civil Rights Act. But what they show is that almost all of the legal action
was individualized disparate treatment cases. To refer to their data, only
6% of the cases included between two and ten plaintiffs. Only .05% of
cases had more than ten plaintiffs, which is a minimum for any meaning-
ful class action. "Collective legal mobilization is rare," they conclude.32
That's a dramatic change from the 1970s, when studies show that far
more civil rights cases were class action cases.
So how did this dramatic change occur? I think this was a pivotal
moment when the Court begins to take apart structural challenges in a
number of rulings. And we've seen other cases that have been talked
about over the last two days where this has continued on in various other
30. Id. at 661 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Justice Blackmun's dissent speaks to the erasure of social facts: "One wonders whether
the majority still believes that race discrimination.., is a problem in our society, or even remembers
that it ever was." Id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32. Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employ-
ment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
175, 189 (2010).
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elements: undercutting capacity for class action, for challenging vicari-
ous liability, the Ricci33 and Walmart34 cases-all of which were out-
comes of rulings making structural challenges and collectivist kinds of
remedies difficult if not impossible.
I should mention-and this is the part of the book that we're writ-
ing-that this was certainly not a matter of just the courts acting alone;
this shift was part of a concerted coalitional strategy. Big business began
to organize in the early 1970s with the Business Roundtable, and the
Chamber of Commerce began to make a concerted effort to take away
these efforts of workers to regain voice and position and to challenge
systematic discrimination and empower unions in the workplace. They
developed sophisticated strategies to achieve those ends, and that includ-
ed working through the Reagan Administration. We see in the begin-
nings of the Reagan Administration that one of the key tools was the
claim about racial and gender "quotas." Disparate impact claims, it was
claimed, were all about installing quotas. This is interesting because the
briefs in the Wards Cove case that mentioned quotas were from the
Chamber of Commerce, from the U.S. government, and other business
interests. However, the plaintiffs in the case never asked for quotas as
remedies. We went back through the whole history of the case, and they
never mention quotas once. Then the Supreme Court comes along and
says that the case was about quotas, even while the majority never talks
about actual conditions in the workplace. Instead they wrote along the
lines of "Let's imagine that if we granted plaintiffs what they requested
in this case, what would employers do? They'd have to create quotas. We
have said quotas are not appropriate responses to the problem of discrim-
ination, so therefore the employers would become discriminators if they
used quotas." This is curious logic not only because it is ungrounded in
the case history and purely hypothetical, but also because many scholarly
studies have shown that employers almost never create quotas in re-
sponse to these kinds of problems. It's all fantasy.
And that is, I think, the situation we find ourselves in today. All of
what we've seen is that we're dealing with a context in which big busi-
ness has been very, very effective in preventing collective action by
workers, both through unions and through class action litigation. I co-
authored a book called Distorting the Law,36 which is about the attempt
of big business to undercut tort litigation, and to create the stigma of the
individual tort litigant as being frivolous, filing frivolous lawsuits and
being selfish and greedy, and the tort lawyer as just a greedy, self-
33. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
34. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
35. Robin Stryker, Disparate Impact and the Quota Debates: Law, Labor Market Sociology,
and Equal Employment Policies, 42 SoC. Q. 13, 29-36 (2001).
36. WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND
THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004).
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interested thug. The same thing has gone on in workplace discrimination
cases. There's been massive public campaign to stigmatize those who
would speak up about discrimination and injustice in the workplace. And
that is one key part of what we usually talk about with regard to the ne-
oliberal era. Neoliberalism is the reassertion of the priority of markets, of
property ownership, contracts, and competition over the premises of
equality.
This development requires us to reconsider the basic promises of
legal equality and rights in a liberal society. On one hand, we have a tra-
dition of property-based, market-based, contractarian rights about owner-
ship and about the power and prerogative of private business owners. But
we also have rights to equality, to equality as citizens to participate to-
gether in collective governance. In the simplest or broadest terms, those
equality rights have always been the key normative resource for subal-
tern groups-people of color, women, immigrants, low-income workers,
the poor-to challenge the persistent material reality of social inequality.
But what has happened now is that the language of equality has been
eviscerated so that the whole political realm is permeated by practices
and premises that are grounded in contractarian, proprietarian, market-
based logics. The worker is now imagined as the entrepreneur in compe-
tition with everyone else for scarce, low-paying jobs, individualizing
struggle in ways that only make it more difficult for collective challenge
to hierarchical power. Key legal resources that enabled such collective
challenges have been erased, or at least eroded, in civil rights law. And in
the process, the older structural logics of discrimination have been for-
gotten. As Robert Cover once argued, the legal system systematically
"forgets" a lot of visions of rights and justice, because only the winners
of lawsuits continue on as part of the story, and those who either settle or
maybe lose are just forgotten in history.37 And that is what happened in
these struggles to a large extent. So again, my interest as a sociolegal
scholar is to recover that part of history.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, I want to say that the problem is not the intrinsic limita-
tions of rights. It's not necessarily the limitations of litigation. The prob-
lem is in the killing of those legal resources of specific rights construc-
tions and litigation opportunities that once supported collective work-
place politics, what Robert Cover called "jurisgenetic" politics of vision-
ary social justice from below.
38
I put up on the screen before my talk a picture of Tyree Scott. Scott
was an African-American who fought as a marine in Vietnam, came back
37. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 47-49 (1983).
38. See id. at 11.
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home, but could not find work as an electrician with his father because
they were squeezed out of the building trades in Seattle, which were con-
trolled by all-white unions. Tyree formed his own all-black union. He set
up a public interest law firm of nonlawyers, called LELO (Labor and
Employment Law Office). The LELO leaders were the architects of the
Wards Cove case. The picture I put up before was a letter from LELO
worker activists that expressed some disagreement with their lawyer over
continuing to litigate under the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Their whole ar-
gument was that law is not neutral and apolitical. Law is simply a site of
the contestation between the haves and the have-nots. We have to view
law in that way, Tyree always stressed, as in denying it we will miss
what is really going on. His aim was not to dismiss law and rights as
meaningless, but rather to raise the bar for figuring out how to make
rights real.
And that is how I think about that moment of political activism
around workplace discrimination in the 1970s and 1980s. Again, it was
not just around gender-based wage pay equity; a lot of activism was
around race, by blacks and Asian-Americans and Latinos. The trio of
cases that included Wards Cove was part of a broad, diffuse, largely un-
coordinated movement involving legal cases by minority and female
workers-all expressing similar political aspirations for equality and
justice, from the bottom up, each mobilizing around lawsuits and Title
VII claims just like we see in pay equity cases.
So where does leave us now? One strategy might be to imagine how
can we reclaim the 1964 or 1991 Civil Rights Acts or write a new Civil
Rights Act. The plaintiffs in the Wards Cove case, immediately after
what they thought was a failure of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, formed a
national campaign and went around trying to build support for what they
called the Third Reconstruction of Civil Rights. Their goal was a new
Civil Rights Act that restored disparate impact and related challenges to
institutionalized inequality. However, they gave up after a number of
years, as even during the Clinton years there was no support for the
cause. They could not find a sympathetic public, the labor unions gave
up, women's groups focused on other issues, and there was no one in
federal government paying attention. I do not want to rule out the vision
of restoring a new civil rights act, but I am skeptical.
I think, at the very least, what we need to do instead is to draw on
the power and importance of the structural challenges-structural logics
of inequality-in a host of new, more disaggregated ways. I tend to think
that antidiscrimination, despite the ongoing radical success of LGBT
advocates, is exhausted as a framework for challenging systemic eco-
nomic inequality that most affects people of color and women. I am not
urging abandoning intent-based civil rights advocacy, but we need to
move beyond it. If we want to take the next step forward, we need to
focus directly on the bottom two-thirds of society, which is radically
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underpaid, exploited, and insecure. We need to think about a menu of
different but interrelated ways that we can bring empowerment through
wages and work opportunities to them. Then we can continue to deal
with the other manifestations of race, gender, and sexual discrimination.
If we really want to deal with the economic issues, with money, sex, and
power, we need to think and talk about it differently. Change can happen,
but it is going to have to come from below.
This means that we need to build stronger bonds among progressive
groups committed to social justice. At the policy level, I suggest several
priorities. First, we need to raise dramatically minimum wage standards,
both at local levels and at the national level. The struggle to raise the
state minimum wage in Washington to $15, which has already succeeded
in some local levels, is a place to begin. I also propose that we go back to
the Fair Labor Standards Act and begin to think about various ways to
build on that. Maybe go back to the old protective legislation model,
which paved the way for a variety of the 1930s reforms that were not
gender-specific, and think about what we might do about issues with
hours, what we need to do with family-leave policies, and the like. I will
be honest that I don't have the answers, except hat I think we need to
look for new angles to deal with the big problems.
In short, we need a comprehensive set of reforms. The 1964 Civil
Rights Act did not offer that, but many people took inspiration from the
Act to think broadly, and we should take inspiration from that past. But
even if we shift focus away from the logic of antidiscrimination, we
should not give up on rights. Rights are very important resources. Our
legacy of liberal rights authorizes claims of equal citizenship, and jobs,
work activity, and work income are very important preconditions for
becoming a respected, active citizen in public life. We find ourselves in a
period where those claims of equality have been significantly diminished
and overpowered by the claims of markets and property ownership and
private prerogative. But, I think that is where we have to resume the
struggles-back on the core terrain of making equal rights mean some-
thing again. Let us not abandon that part of the fight.
One last, closely related point: I think that we must make the im-
portant move to begin to appeal much more to positive socioeconomic
rights embedded in international human rights traditions. The United
States is woefully behind the world in taking human rights seriously.
When I look around and say, "what discursive resources can be a lever
for change?" I repeatedly come back to the human rights principles of
positive socioeconomic rights. This tradition animated A. Philip Ran-
dolph and Martin Luther King, a host of feminist activists including to-
day Martha Nussbaum, and the Filipino cannery worker activists who
were defeated by the neoliberal logic of the U.S. Supreme Court. Making
human rights discourse a reality is not going to happen tomorrow in the
United States; it is not going to happen even in my lifetime. But I do
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believe it is among the most promising routes for progressive, egalitari-
an, democratic change. Social rights fits well with claims of higher living
wage, gender- and race-based wage equity, accessible health care for all,
family leave, and a host of other causes that we have discussed at this
conference. Framing claims as human rights will not guarantee a better
world, but it is one of the most promising normative strategies for mak-
ing equal rights a real, meaningful agenda for social transformation.
